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Response
One argument against admitting identity statements made by a
child victim to a doctor under section 90.803(4) is that the Florida Legis-
lature thought of expanding it to include children, but then chose instead
to add a new exception.' However, the excited utterance hearsay excep-
tion was also to be expanded to include children in that same bill, but in
the bill's final form it did not include the excited utterance expansion.2
It would follow that statements of identity should not be admitted under
the excited utterance hearsay exception just as the medical diagnosis
hearsay exception, but that is not the case. In Leding v. State, the lower
court allowed a father to testify as to what the children said to him
regarding the appellant trying to entice young children into his car under
the excited utterance hearsay exception.' Appellant asserted that the
trial court did not follow section 90.803(23) regarding the admissibility
of out-of-court statements made by child victims. The court affirmed
the conviction, holding that section 90.803(23) was an additional excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, and was added to expand section 90.803, not
limit it.
Another argument is that a statement that is admissible under sec-
tion 90.803(4) will be automatically admissible under section
90.803(23) if it is reliable. That is not the case. Section 90.803(4) state-
ments are reliable because of the circumstances surrounding the making
of the statement. A statement made by a child who understands the
reason why he is going to the doctor, and the doctor has explained to the
child truthful statements will make him better ensure the reliability of
the statement. If the statement is not found to be reliable as set by
United States v. Renville, then the statement should not be admitted.
Section 90.803(23), on the other hand, deals with children in judi-
cial proceedings. There are so many requirements to section 90.803(23)
that statements that may be found reliable under section 90.803(4) may
not be admitted under section 90.803(23). For example, there is an age
requirement that the child making the statement must be eleven years
old or younger. At age twelve, the child who is sexually abused in Flor-
ida is barred from admitting his statement to a doctor identifying his
abuser because he is too old under section 90.803(23) and the statement
1. State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 826 (Fla. 1993); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (2000).
2. See Celina E. Contreras, Comment Has Florida Won or Lost the Battle by Eliminating
Section 90.803(4) as an Alternative Tool in Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse, U. MIAMI L. REV.
533, 546 n.90 (2001).
3. 725 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
is completely inadmissible under section 90.803(4). That is an immense
problem because the only witnesses to the crime are the child and the
abuser, therefore, the abuser will get away with having abused a child.
While it may be true that a child at that age may be able to testify, that is
not the reason for the medical diagnosis hearsay exception. It is to get
the truth of what happened from the beginning and to prove that from
the beginning the child identified that abuser. Additionally, there must
be a case specific finding of reliability and the source must indicate
trustworthiness. After that has been determined, the child must testify
and if the child cannot testify because he is found to be likely to suffer
severe emotional harm, then there must be corroborative evidence.4 In
the case In re CW, a child was found to be competent to stand trial but
on the stand she said she could not remembered what happened, her
statements were found to be inadmissible because there was no corrobo-
ration. Lastly, if there is not sufficient notice given, then the evidence is
excluded.
The Florida Supreme court in Jones did rely on a Maryland case,
Cassidy v. State, in rejecting the possibility of entering statements under
section 90.803(4). However, months after Cassidy was decided, In re
Rachel Th determined that statements made by a five year old identifying
her abuser were admissible under the medical diagnosis hearsay excep-
tion because the trial court found that the child understood that her state-
ments would be used to provide appropriate medical treatment. The
rationale was that the identity of the abuser was pertinent to medical
diagnosis because the alleged abuser had regular access to the child and
was trusted and known by the child. The physician specifically needed
to know if the child was exposed to a venereal disease, whether to give
the child a tetanus shot, and whether the most effective treatment
included removing the child from her home and away from the alleged
abuser.6
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4. See In re CW, 681 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
5. 549 A.2d 27 (Md. Court. Spec. App. 1988).
6. Id. at 34-35.
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